










The paper has a negative and a positive side. The negative side argues that neither the 
classical notions of narrow nor wide content are suitable for the purposes of 
psychological explanation. The positive side shows how to characterize an alternative 
notion of content (ecological content) that meets those requirements. This account is 
supported by (a) a way of conceptualizing computation that is constitutively 
dependent upon properties external to the system and (b) some empirical research in 
developmental psychology. 
My main contention is that an adequate computational explanation of the behavior 
involved in cognitive activities should invoke a concept of content that can capture 
the intimate dynamical relationship between the inner and the outer. The notion of 
content thus reaches out to include the set of skills, abilities and know-hows that an 
agent deploys in a constantly variable environment. The assumption underlying my 
attempt to characterize this ecological notion of content is that cognition is better 
understood when treated as embedded cognition and that the idea of cognitive 
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 Paramount among the (recent) historical roots of the notion of narrow 
content is Putnam's (in)famous Twinearth thought-experiment. Putnam 
(1975) describes a pair of microphysically identical twins who differ only in 
their absolute relational properties. In particular, some of one twin's thoughts 
are caused by H2O, while the other's (on 'Twinearth') are caused by a 
superficially identical liquid XYZ. But despite their neural and bodily 
microphysical identity one twin has thoughts that are about water and the 
other does not. Thus it would seem that thought content is not fully 
determined by (does not supervene upon1) microphysical states of the brain. 
Thought content looks to be individuated by reference to the subject's 
environmental context and not by reference to her intrinsic physical 
properties. This is the main contention of the 'externalist' —one who holds 
that mental contents are fixed by a subject's relations to external (extra-neural, 
extra-bodily) states of affairs. This postion, however, can seem unsatisfactory 
if we also hold that thought content should play a causal role in explaining 
e.g. the origins of the gross bodily responses which will be shared by the 
microphysically identical twins. The notion of narrow content is then invoked 
to plug the explanatory lacuna left by the strong externalist view. The guiding 
idea is thus that even if Putnam is right and a dimension of the content of a 
thought is relational or externalist (namely, that dimension of content that 
matters when we want to fix the truth-conditions of the sentence used to 
express that thought), there must  in addition be some other dimension of 
content that is non-relational, i.e., a dimension of content that can be fixed 
regardless of the relations that obtain between the thinker and the external 
world. It is this narrow dimension of content that matters, it seems, whenever 
we want to provide psychological explanations (cfr. Fodor 1987: chapter 2)2. 
The stage is thus set for the debate between internalism and externalism. 
 Let us characterize internalism as the view that holds both that the 
content of a mental state supervenes on intrinsic physical states of the subject, 
and that such contents are individuated 'narrowly', i.e., without essential 
reference to the subject's physical and social environment. The externalist 
position, by contrast, denies that mental contents supervene on intrinsic 
physical properties of the subject. The externalist claims that contents are 
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individuated 'widely', i.e., by reference to the subject's environmental or 
social context. 
 I agree with the externalist (See Burge 1979, 1986, 1993; Peacocke 1993, 
1994)3 that psychological explanation (both of the folk and scientific variety) 
does not require the full classical notion of narrow content. But there is surely 
something correct about the intuitions which drive the dissenters to a vision 
of narrow content. What is correct, I believe, is that we do indeed need to 
avail ourselves of some kind of non-relational account of what it means to 
have a thought with a particular content if we are to provide good scientific 
psychological explanations. In this paper I will try to steer a middle way. I 
will argue that narrow content —or, at least, the standard notion of narrow 
content developed by Fodor— can't fulfill the function for which it was 
designed, i.e., that narrow content is not, after all, an adequate theoretical tool 
for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation. I will then defend a 
different notion of content, neither narrow nor traditionally wide, that seems 
better to meet our psychological explanatory needs.  
 Along the way I will invoke two additional theoretical tools. The first 
is a way of conceptualizing computation that is constitutively dependent 
upon properties external to the system (Section 3). The second is some 
empirical research in developmental psychology that aims to vindicate a 
similar approach for understanding psychological development (Karmiloff-
Smith 1986, 1992; Rutkowska, 1990, 1991, 1993a, 1993b). I will introduce these 
empirical results in Section 4. With these tools in hand, I will argue (Section 5) 
for a new notion of content: one that is methodologically more appropriate 
for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation. This is the notion 
that I shall dub ecological content. 
 The discussion thus involves both a negative and a positive claim. The 
negative claim (Sections 1 and 2) is that neither the classical notions of narrow 
nor of wide content are suitable for the purposes of psychological 
explanation. The positive claim (Sections 3, 4 and 5) is that there exists an 




1. The Nature and Role of Narrow Content. 
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 There are at least two features of narrow content on which everybody 
seems to agree. First, narrow content strongly supervenes on intrinsic, non-
intentional, physical properties of an organism. It is precisely that feature 
which makes narrow content narrow4. The second relevant feature is that 
narrow content is invoked mainly, if not exclusively, for predicting and 
explaining behavior.  
 Given just these two features, one might well ask what makes narrow 
content 'content' at all. But interestingly enough this issue is usually finessed 
by making a general assumption: that whatever is going on in the head of a 
subject such that we invoke it to account for her behavior deserves to be 
treated as a contentful state of some kind. The image of the mind as a 
computer undergirds this assumption. According to a classical version of the 
computational view, intentional states are supported by states that involve 
symbols of a mental language or Language of Thought (Fodor 1975). My belief 
that there is an apple pie in the fridge involves my being in some kind of 
computational relation to the mentalese symbols corresponding to “There is an 
apple pie in the fridge”. The content of such an intentional state is just the 
content of that chain of symbols in mentalese and the fact that it is a belief —
instead of a desire or a doubt— is determined by the nature of its 
computational relation to the rest of my mental states and / or my behaviour. 
The symbols of that mental language possess a combinatorial syntax and are 
physically implemented by the brain. 
 Thus, even if we don't offer any theory about what narrow content 
actually is or about what makes narrow content 'content', the following can 
be said: narrow content serves the purposes of scientific psychological 
explanation. It picks out intrinsic states that play a causal role in the 
generation of behavior, and it is thus capable of figuring in causal-
explanatory accounts of intentional action. Narrow contents thus satisfy the 
demand that scientific explanations should be causal explanations and that only 
intrinsic properties can be causally explanatory. The justification of this view, 
in turn, flows from the physicalist bias of standard scientific methodology, 
i.e., the idea that the causal powers of any event are completely determined 
by its physical features. As a result, only content that is individuated in terms 
of a system's intrinsic properties is deemed adequate for a scientific 
explanation of behavior. 
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Add a computationalist spin to this physicalistic bias and the nature of 
narrow content finally emerges. According to the computational theory of 
mind, cognitives capacities are to be treated as information-processing 
operations and to be characterized in computational terms. Computational 
processes are defined, in turn, in terms of operations on representations. 
Input-representations stand for arguments in a function. Output-
representations constitute the values of the computed function. A 
representation is thus a very special kind of physical configuration, a physical 
configuration that has a syntactic vehicle and a semantic content. The 
important point is that, although computer processes are only sensitive to the 
syntax, a computing device can be designed in such a way that the 
production of syntactic states respects the semantic interpretation. Under 
such conditions, the semantics does indeed supervene on the syntax. But even 
so, there remains a (fatal) problem afflecting any attempt to then identify 
some more specific syntactical state (e.g. a particular pattern of activity in a 
neuronal population) with a certain semantic content. The problem is nicely 
described by Ned Block who comments that: "syntactically identical objects 
can play very different functional roles, and be associated with very different 
recognitional capacities" (Block 1991: 39). In the same vein Stalnaker claims 
that the 
 
[Physical or syntactical properties of a thought token] surely 
will not be sufficient to determine even the narrow content of 
the thought token. Presumably, the same particular physical 
event or state that is a particular thought that water is the best 
drink for quenching thirst might, if the functional organization 
of the thinker were different enough, have not only a different 
wide content, but also a different narrow content. 
(Stalnaker 1990: 135) 
 
 In other words, the properties that seem to account for a state's narrow 
content and that would justify its intentional (i.e., semantic) role for the 
internalist are not syntactical properties of individual thought tokens. The 
upshot, it seems to me, is that even if we accept that the mental states must 
supervene on a system's intrinsic physical description, we must still recognize 
that specific mental states are not constituted by syntactic properties. Instead, 
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the individuation even of narrow contents will depend on further facts 
concerning the large scale functional organization of the system. Such a 
concession, however, immediately paves the way for an even more radical 
proposal: the proposal to extend the supervenience base to include not just 
facts about the larger scale details of the inner economy, but to include facts 
about what might be termed the local ecological economy. This would 
include both the organism itself and certain aspects (this restriction to be 
discussed later) of local environmental structure. This is the proposal to be 
pursued in Sections 3-5. First though, we should notice a few more problems 
with the traditional notions of both narrow and wide content. 
 
 
2. Narrow Content, Wide Content and Scientific Psychology. 
 
 Can any kind of narrow content really fulfill the explanatory role for 
which it has been created? In other words, can the causal explanation of an 
agent's behavior consist in the specification of the role played by her internal 
states as specified by an internalist content-involving description?5 By an 
internalist content-involving description I mean the kind of description that 
would be cashed out in terms of the system's intrinsic properties 
characterized independently of the system's interaction with its environment. 
One problem is that whenever we try to formulate such descriptions, we lose 
the very narrowness that we were trying to capture. This is because 
psychological explanations invoke mental states with particular intentional 
contents in order to explain or justify a given course of action. The 
individuation of a mental state as an allegedly explanatory state with such-
and-such a particular content is then achieved in part by appealing to 
properties of the external objects and events that are implicated in a particular 
behavior. But, if this is so, then those content-involving descriptions can't 
really be of a purely internalist kind; they can't be narrow content-involving 
descriptions. 
 At this stage, a distinction might be drawn between narrow content as 
explanatory of a subject's attempt to do something and narrow content as 
explanatory of why that attempt succeeded, if it did succeed, or failed, if it 
failed. The subject's external environment is indeed relevant to explaining the 
success or failure of any attempt to perform a given action. An internalist 
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interested in the explanatory aspect of narrow content might claim that 
narrow content matters also if we want to explain the success or failure of the 
actions performed by the subject in its environment. Let's call this internalist's 
goal oriented position a Type 0 claim6. 
 It seems to me, however, that Type 0 claims need not be a threat to the 
kind of position I am going to defend. Legitimate as they are, Type 0 claims 
aim to address an issue different from the one I am concerned with in this 
paper. The evaluation of the appropriateness of the notion of narrow content 
that I am concerned with here is tied to the explanation of a system's behavior, 
i.e., the explanation of why someone tried to do something. This is the central 
issue for psychology. The explanation of the success or failure of such 
attempts is obviously important from some other points of view (e.g., from an 
evolutionary point of view) but it is not important from a psychological 
perspective. In the next section, I shall mention David Papineau's concern 
with this problem, but for now, the following should be clear. Type 0 claims 
concern why a subject achieves or fails to achieve a certain goal, while the 
claims that are relevant for the discussion at hand concern only the actions 
displayed by a subject in pursuing a goal. 
 A sensible internalist, concerned with this second issue, would agree 
that to explain behavior, we must know what in the subject's external 
environment is being represented to that subject. But this internalist will 
insist that it is still the subject's inner states rather than anything outside her 
head which determine the behavior psychology needs to explain. In other 
words, the sensible internalist will still insist that the subject's internal and 
narrowly individuated states determine her beliefs and therefore explain her 
behavior. Let's call the sensible internalist's weakly environment-invoking 
position a Type I claim. 
 In reply to the sensible internalist, let me say the following. Remember 
that I am arguing against the explanatory adequacy of a given concept, namely, 
narrow content, for scientific psychology. My worry is thus that the exchange 
between subject and environment might at times be so complex, and the 
dynamics of the overall coupled system so different from the dynamics of 
either component alone, that it is often much more methodologically fruitful to 
take the dynamics of the whole (subject cum local environment) as the basic 
explanatory unit in psychology. Let's call this stronger position a Type II 
claim. 
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 Next, suppose we take computational psychology as representative of 
scientific psychology. The sensible (Type I) internalist insists on the 
individualistic character of the concepts involved in adequate computational 
explanations of behavior. The issue is thus whether the concepts involved in 
computational explanations ought to have such an individualistic character or 
not. This question probably can't be resolved without providing a full account 
of the notion of explanatory adequacy and a description of how that account 
fits into the framework of computational psychology. But even without such 
an account, some interesting examples can be provided to help distinguish 
the different issues involved in Type I and Type II claims7. 
 Think of Scrabble-playing strategies8. While playing, we may 
physically arrange and rearrange the letter tiles as a way of prompting recall 
of candidate words. A computational psychology concerned with the 
explanation of this kind of behavior might usefully characterize such external 
manipulations as a means of providing inputs to prompt a pattern-
completing associative memory. Such a picture is, however, nicely compatible 
with the weak Type I model. For the Type I internalist needs only think of the 
world as a source of inputs and an arena for action. She can agree that the 
possibility of individuating the computational states of cognitive systems is 
relative to the properties of the world that they inhabit. But this is to say that 
the world determines  the agent's cognitive states (via the inputs), and not that 
external features can play any role in constituting such states.  
 The stronger Type II theorist aims to show that sometimes such a 
division between world and agent is not productive; that it is not always 
methodologically appropriate for psychological purposes. Think e.g. of 
swimming. It is not just that we hit the water and trigger a swimming routine. 
Instead, we produce a movement, the water flow changes and that alteration 
calls forth a new movement, and so on. Now, maybe you could analyze this 
case as a complex combination of inputs prompting inner states which 
prompt actions. But it may be much more explanatorily fruitful to treat brain, 
body and water here as a complex coupled whole with its own intrinsic 
dynamics. 
 Kirsh and Maglio's thorough analysis of expert performance on the 
computer game Tetris (See Kirsh & Maglio 1994) provides a neat example of 
such a Type II claim. Tetris players have to place blocks of different geometric 
shapes (Zoids) into compact surfaces (rows). When a row is completed, it 
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disappears from the screen and new zoids begin to fall again —from the top 
of the screen— at a speed that increases with successful performance of the 
game. While falling, the player can operate on the zoid —rotate it, move it to 
the left, to the right, or drop it directly to the bottom of the row. The purpose 
of the game is thus to match zoid-shapes and row-shapes under —severe— 
time constraints. What Kirsh and Maglio have shown is that advanced 
players of Tetris, although able to mentally rotate a zoid so as to better 
determine its shape, often prefer to rotate the zoid physically (this is an option 
in the game), because this external manipulation is both faster and more 
reliable9. 
 Physical Zoid rotation, Kirsh & Maglio suggest, is best thought of as a 
proper part of a distinct computational sub-routine invoked during expert 
play. The fact that this sub-routine incorporates a "call to the world" is less 
important than the fact that it constitutes a computationally unified whole. 
The density of information flow within the sub-routine (including the 
operations performed in the world) is so great and so temporally complex 
that the decomposition of the system into biological wetware and local 
environment structure is less revealing, from a computational point of view, 
than the decomposition into a set of sub-routines one of which is partly 
constituted by operations performed out in the real world. 
 What these experiments suggest is that some cognitive states may be 
best characterized in terms of world-involving skills or abilities rather than 
merely in terms of the inner brain structures underlying performance. The 
question is thus whether the best unit of analysis for understanding cognitive 
organization is always the bare biological device or whether it is sometimes 
the agent plus a select chunk of the local environment (See also Hutchins 
1995). The kind of research just discussed suggests that sometimes, at least, 
the latter option is explanatorily attractive. Type II claims are thus not claims 
about the nature of the computational processes involved in psychological 
explanations. They are claims about the methodological advantages of 
looking at coupled systems whose overall dynamics are taken as 
explanatorily central. As should become clearer later in the paper, my 
contention is that the characterization of computational descriptions that is 
most fertile for the explanation of psychological phenomena is externalist in 
this Type II sense (cfr. Peacocke 1994). 
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 The contention is that an adequate computational explanation of the 
behavior involved in many cognitive activities should invoke a concept of 
ecological content —one that captures the intimate dynamical relationship 
between the inner and the outer. If that notion of content is to play its 
explanatory role, then we should characterize it in such a way that it couldn't 
be ascribed to an agent except insofar as the agent is embodied and 
embedded in a particular environment. It follows that the notion of content 
will not be narrow in the standard individualist sense. I thus aim to defend a 
notion of content that is neither traditionally narrow nor traditionally wide, 
yet which serves the purposes of scientific psychological explanation in a way 
consistent with both the supervenience constraint and the insights concerning 
embodied and situated cognition. It should already be clear how ecological 
content differs from standard narrow content. What about wide content? 
 Wide content, as explained in the Introduction, is basically a semantic 
device for the individuation of propositional attitudes, i.e., it is the semantic 
component required in order to fix e. g. the truth-conditions of the sentences 
used to express different beliefs. Notice, then, that the notion of ecological 
content —insofar as it is a notion geared to the explanatory requirements of 
Cognitive Science— is not a real competitor with traditional wide content. 
Here is why. 
 First, to argue the need for a semantic device like wide content is not 
necessarily to rule out the possibility of also invoking some notion of narrow 
notion. Indeed, so-called dual factor theories attempt to provide an 
explanation of the content of our utterances and mental states in terms that 
thus involve two different notions, each motivated by separate concerns. One 
notion —the psychologically relevant one— deals with the causal explanatory 
aspect of mental states and/or sentences. The other deals with contentful 
mental states and/or sentences as related to propositions, i.e., as objects that 
can be assigned referential truth-conditions (See McGinn 1982; Block 1986). A 
notion of content designed to play an explanatory role in psychology thus 
doesn't necessarily conflict with a notion of wide content: it represents a 
challenge only for its individualistic counterpart10. 
 Second, the friend of wide content is concerned not only to make a 
constitutive claim about what makes something a state with a particular 
content, but also to display the relational character of the explananda of Folk 
Psychology, i.e., of the kind of psychology concerned with the relationships 
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between propositional attitudes and actions. Tyler Burge (1986) and 
Christopher Peacocke (1993, 1994) have been pursuing just such an agenda 
(See also Hornsby 1986). But the kind of psychological explanation that 
matters for the characterization of ecological content is not the folk variety. It 
is scientific psychological explanation that is at issue. Insofar as wide content 
is mainly tied up with folk psychological explanations, it need not be in 
competition with our alternative account.  
 Third, it might be suggested that the truth or falsity of a belief does 
matter. It matters whenever we want to explain why an agent is successful (or 
not) in achieving a certain end. David Papineau, for example, has argued that 
truth values matter whenever we are concerned to explain success and has 
suggested we treat truth as the guarantee of such success (Papineau 1990). 
But even if this argument is sound, it doesn't impinge upon the explanatory 
character of wide content. As I said, wide content is a semantic device that 
fixes truth-conditions, not truth values. Papineau's view involves a clear shift 
from the former to the latter. 
 This is not to deny that truth plays an important role in explaining the 
success of an agent in achieving a certain goal. But it is to deny that truth 
plays any role when what we want to explain is not success or failure but —to 
adopt Papineau's terminology— to explain the means adopted by an agent in 
pursuit of a certain goal. This is because the external properties that 
determine the truth-conditions of a sentence (as the expression of a thought) 
are usually microphysical properties of the environment surrounding the 
individual. Thus, any sentence containing the expression 'water' will have as 
part of its truth-conditions a possible world in which the reference of the 
word is H2O. But these properties need not affect a subject's psychology, if 
we take it that psychological states are invoked to explain behavior. For if the 
liquid in Lake Michigan turns out to be made of XYZ instead of H2O, but 
nothing other that this microphysical composition has changed, there is no 
reason to suppose that the behavior of the agents in contact with that 
substance would change either. These microphysical differences matter for 
the individuation of wide contents but they don't make any computational 
difference to the subject and, as such, don't affect what we are calling 
ecological contents. To further clarify this notion, let us first make a small 




3. Computation and Explanation. 
 
 A major rationale for the claim that the idea of narrow content is 
needed for the purposes of scientific psychology is the conviction that 
scientific psychological explanations will be computational. Computational 
processes, it is said (Fodor 1981) cannot be sensitive to external properties. 
Therefore psychological explanations can only involve internal properties. 
Since my argument aims to both undermine the role of narrow content in 
psychological explanations and to maintain the foundational role of 
computation in Cognitive Science, it must invoke a different account, if not of 
the nature of computation, at least of the best way of conceptualizing  
computational explanations. 
 What is at issue then is whether the kind of properties that are most 
fruitful for conceptualizing computational explanations of behavior ought 
indeed to be internalist properties? Might a suitably externalist account of the 
computational properties which explain behavior in fact be better than an 
internalist account? A popular way of arguing for such a possibility is to 
argue for a notion of computational states whose individuation is sensitive to 
external properties in the sense that, without invoking them in our taxonomy, 
we couldn't specify the causal organization of the system (Peacocke 1993, 
1994). That idea, however, remains a little too close to a Type I claim. The 
basic individualistic assumption is unaffected: it is assumed that modulo its 
external individuation, the content of a thought still supervenes on the inner 
vehicles of that thought. By contrast, I aim to argue for a genuinely (Type II) 
externalist account of computationalism. We may begin by rehearsing (what I 
take to be) the main reason why the classic individualistic view of 
computation has so long prevailed11. 
 A key factor underlying this persistence is the long-standing tendency 
to treat cognition in a completely disembodied fashion. This disembodied 
approach not only has failures of its own, but has also contributed to a notion 
of computational organization that systematically marginalizes the properties 
of the environment in which the system is embedded. But such a 
disembodied computational approach looks increasingly ill-suited to the 
explanation of adaptive success. This is reflected although important in 
certain restricted domains, the disembodied computational approach is no 
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longer the only model in psychology. Neither is it in the philosophy of mind. 
Other constructs for understanding cognition have lately been developed in 
different areas of Cognitive Science. Artificial Life (especially work in robotics 
and Autonomous Agent theory) is one of those areas (See e.g. Ackley & 
Littman 1992, Beer 1990, Brooks 1991, Harvey et al. 1993, Hinton & Nowland 
1987). The notion of representation employed within these models invokes a 
kind of content-involving computational description that is Type II 
externalist. In these accounts cognition is characterized basically in terms of 
actions, i.e., in terms of the exchanges between the physical / biological 
features of an organism and those of the environment in which the organism 
is embedded and functioning. Where content-involving computational 
descriptions are suitable for the explanation of such a cognizer's behavior, 
they involve a notion of content that is partly constituted by the abilities of 
the systems to interact in specific ways with the world in which they are 
embedded. The inner states need not constitute any kind of replica or 
objective model of the world, so much as to engage with those properties of 
the environment that the system needs to co-opt in the service of adaptive 
success. 
 It is worth noticing that I am not thus claiming that a computational 
description is externalist just because the inputs originate in the world. That 
claim would be trivial! My claim is that it can be methodologically fruitful to 
treat certain computational processes as emergent out of the complex 
dynamical properties of a wider system that actually includes chunks of the 
local environment. My claim is thus a Type II claim according to which 
psychological explanation would be better served if we appeal to a dimension 
of enacted content, i.e., a notion of content that supervenes on interactions 
between the system and its environment (cfr. Varela et al. 1991). It is this 
notion of enacted content that is needed to explain why cognitive agents 
behave in the way they do, and to generate useful predictions of their 
behavior. Given that the explanation and prediction of behavior are the aims 
of psychology, it is not difficult to see that, once computational descriptions 
are understood in this externalist way, we have effectively secured their 
scientific role. In the next Section, I rehearse some of the empirical support for 
this kind of computational externalism. 
 
4. Perceptual-Cognitive Development. 
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 A variety of psychological and psychophysical experiments look to 
challenge the individualist philosopher's claim that "whole subjects plus 
embedding environments do not make up integrated, computational 
systems" (Segal 1991: 492). For example, the especially crucial role of subject / 
environment interactions in computational theorizing about human 
development suggests an explanatory paradigm convivial to the Type II 
externalist. This research supports the idea that a notion of content fit to play 
an explanatory role in psychology can't always be defined independently of 
the properties of the environment with which the organism interacts. 
 An example. Tracking moving objects, defensive motions, stopping 
moving objects and reaching for objects of different shapes and weights are 
all examples of infants' interactions with their environment (Rutkowska 1990, 
1991, 1993a, 1993b). We could try to account for such behavior by reference to 
purely internal states of representation and computation. But in doing so, 
Rutkowska claims, we would miss one of the main components of the 
perceptual process, namely, the behavioral component. Purely internalist 
stories fail, Rutkowska suggests, 
 
adequately to consider the role of the behavioral component of 
action in perceptual processing ... Instead [descriptions of 
objects and their properties] can be viewed more pragmatically 
in terms of action programs: virtual mechanisms whose 
operation selectively exploits task-relevant aspects of multiple 
descriptions ... to support the direct invocation of behavioral 
procedures ... Making explicit an aspect of the physical world, 
such as a surface, over many situations does not entail any 
ability to represent it as a property that is common to that range 
of situations, let alone potentially applicable to others 
(Rutkowska, 1993a: 971). 
 
 If we opt for this second, action-guided, approach, we will have to 
acknowledge that visually based representations are not to be conceptualized 
independently of behavioral processes. One reason is that these processes 
often change the viewer's relationship to her/his environment, and this in 
turn changes the information available to visual processing. As these 
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diachronic processes of change are the outcome of our sensory-motor 
systems' local interactions with the environment, they invite a computational 
account based on the concept of action. This computational account could not 
be developed without including as explananda descriptions that involve 
properties that belong to that environment and that are therefore external to 
the system. But more significantly, what we really need, in order to pursue 
this computational strategy, is a truly interactive account of vision in which 
"systems ostensibly 'extrinsic' to literally seeing the world, such as the motor 
system and other sensory systems (auditory, somatosensory), do in fact play a 
significant role in what is literally seen" (P. S. Churchland et al. 1994: 23). 
Underlying this alternative account of the computational organization and 
dynamics of mammalian vision is the idea that the visual system is much 
more intimately integrated with other action systems, such as the motor, 
auditory and somatosensory systems than was previously suspected (but see 
Gibson 1979). This integration, however, is not a hierarchical process in which 
connection to the motor system takes place once the internal representation 
has been fully constituted. Instead: 
 
 ... motor assembling begins on the basis of preliminary and 
minimal analysis. Some motor decisions, such as eye 
movements, head movements, and keeping the rest of the body 
motionless, are often made on the basis of minimal analysis 
precisely in order to achieve an upgraded and more fully 
elaborated visuomotor representation (P. S. Churchland et al, 
1994: 27) 
 
 If this hypothesis is correct —and numerous psychophysical 
experiments, like the ones developed by Rutkowska, seem to support its 
plausibility—, then we must begin to re-think our ideas about computation 
and representation so as to capture the essential interpenetration of sensing, 
thinking and acting. If computational descriptions are going to play a role 
here, they will be best conceptualized in terms of externalist content-
involving descriptions, since the constitutive parameters that fix the content 
of those descriptions will belong to the array of relations between the system 
and properties of its environment. In addition, a great deal of cognition may 
involve tracking properties of objects in such a way that the internal 
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representations of those objects are not representations of the objects 
themselves. Instead, it is only the mode of presentation of the object under a 
particular perspective and within a particular behavioral context that counts. 
The interactive framework for understanding vision proposed by P. S. 
Churchland et al. illustrates this claim. According to Churchland et al., the 
idea of 'pure vision' —that what is seen is just a pure replica of the world 
achieved by the visual system alone— is a radical oversimplification of the kind 
of computational strategies used by the brain. In natural cognition, the 
internal representation of an object is almost always, it seems, mediated by its 
mode of presentation and by the local behavioral context. 
 Such being the general pattern of explanation for our basic cognitive 
abilities, it seems likely that we do indeed need a notion of content that (a) is 
not narrowly individuated (because that leaves out the essential relations 
between the system and the environment) and (b) is not traditionally widely 
individuated either (because the relevant relations must be identified by 
actual patterns of action in, and interaction with, the world —not merely 
introduced by a passive relation of reference.) 
 
 
5. Ecological Content. 
 
 One type of practical interaction (that has already received useful 
philosophical attention) is the kind that involves some discriminative ability 
on the part of the subject. Such discriminative abilities, it has been suggested, 
are pivotal for the project of individuating the contents of our thoughts. This 
claim is found in some of the writings of the later Wittgenstein and is central 
to Dummett's characterization of the nature of a theory of meaning (See 
Dummett 1975, 1976). Closer to the narrow / wide debate itself, Gareth 
Evans' (1982) and Cussins' (1992) distinction between non-conceptual and 
conceptual content represent important steps in an ecological direction. It is 
also a central issue for recent research programs revolving around the idea of 
embedded cognition (cfr. McClamrock 1995). I want to embrace the insight 
provided by these protoecologists —roughly, that the very idea of cognition 
depends on actions and thoughts being contextually circumscribed in specific 
ways— in order to further vindicate a notion of content characterized in 
terms of our discriminative abilities. 
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 At this point, however, the ghost of holism seems to threaten. How are 
we to circumscribe those immediate circumstances in the world on which our 
account depends? This same problem also arises for other (related) 
approaches such as Simon and colleagues' situated action view12. Notice, 
however, that, in elevating a notion of discriminative abilities into a central 
parameter for my notion of ecological content, I need not understand the 
internal representations of contentful thoughts as explicit representations of 
any kind. These representations need not have any declarative or language-
like format. The issue about holism arises mainly when we deal with 
declarative or linguistic internal entities and when we then try to provide a 
systematic account of how the content of different constituent expressions 
contributes to fixing the contents of the whole language. If we don't assume 
language-like representations, the issue of holism can only arise in a rather 
weak sense, i.e., we might want to demarcate the circumstances that ought to 
be considered relevant for a certain content ascription. Here pragmatic 
considerations surely have a role to play, even if such considerations don't 
fully solve the problem. 
 Frege's doctrines look to lie at the root of this trend (Frege 1892). Or, to 
be more precise, Gareth Evans' interpretation of Frege's analysis of identity 
statements in terms of what he calls the 'intuitive criterion of difference' 
(Evans 1982: 18-22). The criterion is intuitive because, as a content-
individuation tool, it relies on abilities that exploit our being connected to the 
objects of our thoughts without assuming that we have any special 
conception of those objects, i.e. without assuming that the untutored subject 
can provide a description of the causal mechanisms underlying those 
interactive abilities. Dummett —commenting on Frege— makes a similar 
point when he claims that "all that is necessary, in order that the senses of two 
names which have the same referent should differ, is that we should have a 
different way of recognizing an object as the referent of each of the two 
names: there is no reason to suppose that the means by which we effect such 
a recognition should be expressible by means of a definite description or any 
other singular term" (Dummett, 1973: 98). In the same vein, although this time 
focusing on the experiential character of our abilities to entertain different 
attitudes toward an object, Cussins points out that  
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the abilities are not available to the subject as the content's referent, but 
they are available to the subject as the subject's experience-based 
knowledge of how to act on the object, and respond to it. The theorist 
may canonically specify the content by referring to abilities, because 
the cognitive significance of the content consists in the experiential 
accessibility of these abilities to the subject in experience-based 
knowing-how.  (Cussins 1992: 655-656) 
 
 Using one of Evans' favorite examples, we could thus say that what 
fixes the content of the experience of hearing a sound as coming from 'over 
there' is the subject's particular ability to negotiate the domain in which she is 
embedded (Evans 1982: 154). To 'negotiate a domain' is to be able to cope 
with a variety of specific situations in a constantly variable environment. It is 
to have a set of skills, abilities and other know-hows that will enable us to 
carry out a particular task, where such skills need not include any explicit 
theoretical knowledge. Even if 'over there' could be substituted salva veritate 
by 'from the North', that doesn't imply that we can describe the subject's 
experience as hearing a sound coming from the North, i.e., it doesn't imply 
that the subject possesses e.g. the concept NORTH THERE, or any of the 
concepts involved in spatial directions. In other words, it doesn't entail that 
the subject has the concept NORTH in any way that can be assimilated to the 
possession of theoretical knowledge. The properties that count for the 
explanation of the subject's behavior are sensory properties that function in a 
structured way so as to support the various movements involved in the 
identification of the sound as coming from a particular place. 
 If we substitute 'content' for 'concept' in the above paragraph, we will 
have a pretty clear vision of the notion of ecological content. Such content is 
constituted by the set of skills, abilities, and know-hows that an agent deploys 
to negotiate a domain. The properties that constitute the state's ecological 
content include only those properties of the environment that make a 
difference to the behavior of the coupled system. But these need not be 
available to the subject as propositional knowledge. From a developmental 
and an evolutionary point of view, explicit propositional knowledge looks to 
come much later than such basic abilities to cope with concrete situations in a 
complex environment. Accordingly, our emphasis is on the agent's capacity 
to adapt to its immediate circumstances in the world, and not on those more 
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objective descriptions that a theorist might introduce as representations of 
those circumstances13. The strong assumption underlying my attempt to 
characterize an explanatory notion of content for psychology is thus that 
cognition is better understood when treated as embedded cognition and 
therefore that the notion of content ought to be cashed out in non-
individualistic and pragmatic terms. 
 Given the evolutionary considerations just mentioned, it might be 
inferred that the notion of ecological content is tied to some kind of 
teleological account of cognition. A word of warning about that. It is certainly 
no surprise that teleological approaches to content fit rather nicely into my 
ecological picture. However, as Peacocke (1993: 224-225) has pointed out, it is 
not true that any plausible externalist theory —and I'm taking the germ of the 
theory sketched here to be both externalist and plausible— has to be of the 
teleological sort. A theory based on the notion of ecological content is clearly 
externalist, but is not necessarily teleological in Millikan's sense, because it 
doesn't have to depend on claims concerning the evolutionary proper function 
of mental states (cfr. Millikan 1984, 1993). 
 To clarify just where e.g. Millikan's approach and the ecological 
approach differ, let me make a very quick remark about 'accidental doubles'. 
An accidental double is someone who (for example) crawls out of a swamp 
due to some kind of subatomic miracle and who happens to be molecule for 
molecule identical to someone else (e.g., me). Millikan's claim is that the states 
of accidental doubles don't have proper functions and thus that their neural 
states don't have any content (as content is teleologically defined in terms of 
proper function and they lack the right sort of history). Equally, the heart of 
my double doesn't have as its proper function the circulation of blood 
because it is not there as a result of the appropriate historical causal chain. 
 But the characterization of content that I defend involves only the 
current properties, relations, dispositions and abilities of a subject. It doesn't 
have in addition to invoke the right individual or evolutionary history. If the 
double that crawls out of the swamp has an experience as of humidity —as I 
imagine she might— nothing in my account would impede the proper 
ascription of a particular ecological content. This is unsurprising, since —as 
remarked earlier— the aim of our analysis is to provide a good theoretical 
base for scientific explanations of behavior. Such explanations, however, do 
not look to require an account of the content of our representations given in 
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evolutionary terms. From the psychological point of view, the agent's 
representations do not have to be tied to the objective conditions for its 
survival. The explanatorily central issue is not the identification of proper 
biological functions, but rather the ability to cope with ecologically relevant 
environmental situations.  
 What, though, of the putative non-individualism of our account? In 
what sense does the stress on abilities to cope with the world comport with 
the idea that certain properties of the world play a constitutive role in the 
fixation of ecological content? Recall Herbert Simon's tale of an ant walking 
on a 'wind- and wave-molded' beach (Simon 1969). The marks on the sand 
form a complex line. If we take the complex geometry of the line as an aspect 
of the ant's behavior, an analysis of that line exclusively in terms of the ant's 
cognition will be completely inadequate. The complexity of the line is 
(partially at least) due to the physical structure of the beach. The moral of the 
story (a Type II story) is that an explanation of this aspect of the ant's 
behavior would be inadequate if it abstracted from the features of the current 
environment in which that behavior is being displayed. What we add —as 
John Haugeland (1995) has pointed out— is now the idea that if we want to 
understand such an agent's behavior, we should treat the agent's internal 
states and aspects of the agent's local environment as an integrated unit. As 
he puts it, we would have to regard Mind as "not incidentally but intimately 
embodied and intimately embedded in its world" (Haugeland 1995: 36). 
Ecological content takes this larger whole as the basic unit for psychological 
explanations. 
 A nice example, provided by McClamrock, is that of speech perception 
or, more precisely, what is known as vowel normalization. This example is 
especially interesting inasmuch as it involves a constitutive claim of much the 
same kind as I have made regarding the ecological character of content. The 
example is taken from a study by Nussbaum and DeGroot (1991) and focuses 
on the fact that "what acoustic pattern counts as a phoneme of a particular 
type is highly dependent on the surrounding speech context" (McClamrock 
1995: 96). What makes an acoustic pattern a particular vowel sound is thus 
something external to that particular pattern. Phonetic identity depends 
constitutively upon patterns surrounding that sound. In the same way, 
properties external to the agent, properties that are environment-involving, 
can constitute key parameters for the individuation of ecological content. 
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Those properties are indeed the result of a constant exchange of information 
between the inner and the outer realm —but that information is not to be 
cashed out in terms of propositional knowledge. It is not explicit information 
for the system. It is the kind of information that makes a computational 
difference to the system without necessarily being explicitly represented by 
the system. 
 If we now return to the (in)famous Twinearth thought experiment, the 
situation can be analyzed as follows. If my Twin and I could notice or reflect 
upon the difference between H2O and XYZ, then the content of our thoughts 
would differ and we would be dealing with good old fashioned narrow 
content. If my Twin and I could not thus notice or conceive any difference 
between H2O and XYZ then, the content of our thoughts would not reflect it 
and therefore we would be dealing with good old fashioned wide content. 
But, there is a third possibility, somewhat obscured by the fact that we often 
fail to distinguish between knowing-how and knowing-that (cfr. Ryle 1963) 
—and thus fall squarely back into the classical 17th century formulations of 
the problem14. It is the possibility that the kind of difference that matters in 
this context may be a computational difference that doesn't necessarily 
involve awareness or propositional knowledge. If, for instance, the density of 
H2O were different from the density of XYZ in such a (subtle) way that the 
motor skills of my Twin and I when swimming had to adjust to that density 
accordingly, there would still be a computational difference of the ecological 
kind. In such a case the subject's mental states need not involve any kind of 
explicit representation of the relevant difference. This is, by the way, one 
respect in which our position differs from e.g. Fodor's new 'correlational' 
theory (Fodor 1994). While Fodorian representations are necessarily explicit, 
the representations invoked in my ecological account are not. They are 
individuated according to particular abilities and, as such, need not exhibit 
any language-like format. Instead, these abilities are constituted, in part, by 
the subject's actual interactions with specific features of the local 
environment. These abilities are keyed to actual activity in specific task-
domains. As a result, the characterizations of content that they provide are 
not specified by reference to the full gamut of e.g. our water-related 
dispositions. Instead they include only the dispositions related to e.g. water 
as the stuff in which I practice specific activities (such as swimming, etc.) 
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characteristic of my normal ecological involvement with the immediate 
environment. 
 In closing, let me emphasize that I have not tried, in this brief 
treatment, to dispel all possible internalist worries. No doubt the sensible 
internalist of Section 1 could still argue for a (Type I) individualistic 
characterization of content that is nonetheless compatible with some 
recognition of these ecological dimensions. But even if an individualistic 
interpretation is always possible, it will not always be as fruitful —from an 
explanatory point of view— or as easily able to display the real world, real-
time dynamics of cognition as is the ecological alternative. Let me also add 
that it was not my aim to provide a fully developed theory of content. My 
hope was only to provide some notes towards a different way of thinking 
about the notion of psychological explanation —a way which lays much more 
stress on the pragmatic, environment-involving, skill-oriented dimensions of 
real-world cognition. As such, my project is largely independent of (and 
might even be compatible with) a more philosophically motivated account of 
content in terms of truth-conditions —just as some account of motion might 
be given independently of an account of the skills underlying those motions. 






1 'Supervenience' is here to be read as strongly supervening in the sense of 
Kim (1984): " ... the supervenience of a family A of properties on another family B 
can be explained as follows: necessarily, for any property F in A, if any object 
x has F, then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily 
anything having G has F. When properties F and G are related as specified in 
the definition, we may say that F is supervenient on G, and that G is a 
supervenience base of F" (Kim 1984: 262). 
 
2 The same kind of strategy had already been followed by Fodor in his 
classic "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in 
Cognitive Psychology" (Fodor 1981). There, however, the vindication of 
narrow content was tied up with the alleged syntactic nature of computation 
and with the characterization of psychological explanations as computational 
explanations. 
 
3 Once a great supporter of narrow content, Fodor himself has also been 
moving lately in the direction of externalism. His claim is that we can have 
everything we want narrow content for (intentional psychological laws, and 
their corresponding computational implementations) without narrow content 
(Fodor 1994). 
 
4 Following Kim's formulation we can say that necessarily, for any 
property F in the family of contentful states, if any object x has F, then there 
exists a property G in the family of physical states such that x has G, and 
necessarily anything having G has F. The main problem with this 
characterization is how to interpret that  notion of necessity. I don't intend to 
address that problem here though. Nothing in my argument requires a 
particular reading of necessity. 
 
5 I borrow the shape of this expression from Peacocke (1993), who 
introduces the notion of externalist content-involving computational 
description. 
 
6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
 
7 See Wilson (1994b) for a possible development of such an account. 
 
8 This example is from Kirsh (1995). 
 
9 The example concerns what they characterize as an epistemic action, 
i.e., an action whose primary purpose is to alter the nature of our own mental 
states, as opposed to pragmatic action, namely, action undertaken because we 
need to alter the world to achieve some physical goal. 
 
10  I have argued elsewhere (Toribio in press) that dual factor 
theories of meaning are fatally flawed in at least two ways. First, their very 
duality constitutes a problem: the two dimensions of meaning (reference and 
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conceptual role) cannot be treated as totally orthogonal without 
compromising the intuition that much of our linguistic and non linguistic 
behavior is based on the cognizer's interaction with the world. Second, 
Conceptual Role Semantics looks unable to explain a crucial feature of 
linguistic representation, viz., the special kind of compositionality known as 
concatenative compositionality. Dual factor theories, I conclude, cannot 
constitute an acceptable philosophical model of content. 
 
 
11 Robert Wilson's recent piece on 'wide computationalism' points in the 
same direction. He argues that " ... the computational argument for 
individualism should be rejected because ... the assumption that 
computational processes in general are individualistic is false in light of the 
possibility and plausibility of wide computationalism in cognitive 
psychology" (Wilson 1994a: 370). Wide computationalism (a Type II thesis) is, 
roughly, the view that the computational systems that are interesting for 
cognitive psychology extend beyond the individual and include parts of the 
system's environment. 
 
12 I thank Marcelo Dascal for pointing this out. 
 
13 In fact, the very structure of the environment sometimes provides 
solutions to problems that would be much more complex if we thought of 
those solutions as solely the result of the cognizer's inner computations (See 
Ballard 1991). 
 
14 Thank to Marcelo Dascal for pointing this out. Notice, in this context, 
that although I am invoking the Rylean distinction between 'knowing that' 
(propositional knowledge) and 'knowing how' (non-propositional 
knowledge), my own account invokes internal representations and therefore 
doesn't have the strong behavioristic flavor characteristic of the pure Rylean 
view.  
 
15 I wish to thank Andy Clark, David Chalmers, Keith Butler, Fernando 
Broncano, Marcelo Dascal and two anonymous referees for helpful comments 
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